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Abstract
With the rise of third parties in the machine learning pipeline,
the service provider in “Machine Learning as a Service”
(MLaaS), or external data contributors in online learning,
or the retraining of existing models, the need to ensure the
security of the resulting machine learning models has become
an increasingly important topic. The security community has
demonstrated that without transparency of the data and the
resulting model, there exist many potential security risks, with
new risks constantly being discovered.
In this paper, we focus on one of these security risks – poi-
soning attacks. Specifically, we analyze how attackers may
interfere with the results of regression learning by poisoning
the training datasets. To this end, we analyze and develop
a new poisoning attack algorithm. Our attack, termed Nopt,
in contrast with previous poisoning attack algorithms, can
produce larger errors with the same proportion of poisoning
data-points. Furthermore, we also significantly improve the
state-of-the-art defense algorithm, termed TRIM, proposed
by Jagielsk et al. [18] (IEEE S&P 2018), by incorporating the
concept of probability estimation of unpolluted data-points
into the algorithm. Our new defense algorithm, termed Proda,
demonstrates an increased effectiveness in reducing errors
arising from the poisoning dataset. We highlight that the time
complexity of TRIM had not been estimated; however, we
deduce from their work that TRIM can take exponential time
complexity in the worst-case scenario, in excess of Proda’s
logarithmic time. The performance of both our proposed at-
tack and defense algorithms is extensively evaluated on four
real-world datasets of housing prices, loans, health care, and
bike sharing services. We hope that our work will inspire
future research to develop more robust learning algorithms
immune to poisoning attacks.
1 Introduction
With the widespread adoption of Machine Learning (ML)
algorithms, it has been elevated out of the exclusive use of
Figure 1: The Poisoning attack on linear regression
high-tech companies. Services such as “Machine Learning
as a Service” (MLaaS) [45] can assist companies without
domain expertise in ML to solve business problems with ML.
However, in the MLaaS setting, there exist poisoning attacks,
in which malicious MLaaS providers can either manipulate
the integrity of the training data supplied by the company
or compromise the integrity of the training process. Alter-
natively, in a collaborative setting, whereby a model holder
solicits data contributions from multiple parties for online
training or retraining of an existing model, a malicious par-
ticipant may provide poisoned training samples in their sub-
mission, thereby infecting the resulting model for all parties.
In such poisoning attacks, the attacker’s objective may be
to indiscriminately alter prediction results, create a denial of
service, or cause specific targeted mis-predictions during test
time. The attacker seeks to create these negative effects while
preserving correct predictions on the remaining test samples
to bypass detection. An inconspicuous attack may produce
dire consequences, thus necessitating to study poisoning at-
tacks on ML. A conceptual example of poisoning attacks is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Many poisoning attacks have been proposed and demon-
strated against different ML architectures. Specially, grey-
box attacks, in which the attacker has no knowledge of the
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training set but has an alternative dataset with the same dis-
tribution as the training set, have been proposed against Sup-
port Vector Machines (SVMs) [6, 33], Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) [34], Logistic Regression (LR) [33], Graph-based
classification [48], and Recommender systems [12]. These
works have shown that poisoning attacks are effective in in-
terfering with the accuracy of producing classifications, or
recommendations by either indiscriminately altering predic-
tion results, or causing specific mis-predictions at test time.
However, the aforementioned attacks target models produc-
ing a label prediction; in this work, we shall focus on models
that perform regression, the prediction of a numerical value.
Thus, with a different functional objective of regression, an
attacker’s objective for poisoning a regression model may
also differ. For example, an attacker may want to increase
or decrease the predicted value, whilst another may want to
maximize the dispersion of the training set. Ma et al. [32] first
propose a white-box poisoning attack against linear regres-
sion, aimed at manipulating the trained model by adversarially
modifying the training set. Additionally, Jagielski et al. [18]
propose a grey-box1 poisoning attack against linear regres-
sion, which aims to increase the loss function on the original
training set.
Our attack contributions. We scrutinize poisoning attacks
on linear regression by improving and redefining the attacker’s
objective in existing attack models and establish a new attack
optimization problem for linear regression. Our new attack,
termed Nopt, is observed to be more efficient than the state
of the art [18] (IEEE S&P 2018), termed Opt, in maximizing
the dispersion of the training set, for the same proportion of
poisoned data-points. Intuitively, the key difference between
Opt [18] and Nopt is that the optimization evaluated for each
subsequent poisoning point is performed on a dataset that
includes all previous poisoning points, thereby creating a
new poisoning point that maximizes the loss of the collective
training dataset of original clean and poisoning points.
To defend against poisoning attacks on regression learning,
defense mechanisms have been proposed [4, 7, 35, 36, 41].
One such approach treats poisoning attack data-points as out-
liers, which can be counteracted with data sanitization tech-
niques [9,17,39] (i.e., input validation and removal). Another
approach is through robust learning [18, 30, 41, 52], as learn-
ing algorithms based on robust statistics are intrinsically less
sensitive to outlying training samples; the robustness can be
realized through bounded losses or specific kernel functions.
Ma et al. [32] leverage differential privacy as a defensive mea-
sure against poisoning attacks on linear regression. Jagielski
et al. [18] propose a defense algorithm against regression
learning poisoning attacks, named TRIM. TRIM offers high
robustness and resilience against a large number of poisoning
attacks.
1The assumptions of [18] is the same as ours, albeit previously mislabelled
as a black-box attack.
We highlight that the time complexity of TRIM had not been
estimated; however, we deduce from their work that TRIM can
take exponential time complexity in the worst-case scenario,
in excess of our defense (termed Proda)’s logarithmic time.
Our defense contributions. We define a new defense algo-
rithm against poisoning attacks, termed Proda. We are the
first to introduce the concept of probability estimation of un-
polluted data-points into the defense algorithm. Proda demon-
strates an increased effectiveness in reducing errors arising
from the poisoning dataset. Additionally, the time complex-
ity of Proda is also lower than the state-of-the-art defense of
TRIM [18] (IEEE S&P 2018). The key insight of achieving
better efficacy is that we have prior knowledge that from the
sets of points we randomly sample, there must be a group of
points that all belong to the unpolluted dataset. Therefore,
when comparing the minimum mean squared error (MSE) val-
ues of some groups of data-points, even if there are poisoning
points in the group of the smallest MSE, they must conform
to the original distribution and rules of the training dataset,
and will have little impact on altering the regression model.
In this paper, we systematically study the poisoning attack
and its defense for linear regression models with the online
learning setting. We define a new poisoning attack on lin-
ear regression to maximize the dispersion of the training set.
Additionally, we develop a new probabilistic defense algo-
rithm against poisoning attacks, named Proda. We extensively
evaluate poisoning attacks and defenses across different four
regression models (Ordinary Least Squares, Ridge Regression,
LASSO, Elastic-Net) trained on multiple datasets originating
from different fields, including house pricing, loans, pharma-
ceuticals, and bike sharing services. In summary, the overall
contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We develop a new grey-box poisoning attack against
regression models, termed Nopt. Nopt outperforms the
state-of-the-art attack, termed Opt, proposed by Jagielsk
et al. [18] (IEEE S&P 2018).
• We fill in the missing gap by proving that the state-of-
the-art defense, termed TRIM [18], is estimated to have
exponential time complexity in the worst-case scenario,
in excess of our Proda’s logarithmic time.
• We further overhaul TRIM and propose to date the
most effective defense against poisoning attacks, termed
Proda. The performance of both our proposed attack
and defense algorithms is extensively evaluated on four
real-world datasets of housing prices, loans, health care,
and bike sharing services.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to systemati-
cally design, develop, and evaluate the poisoning attack and
defense for online regression models. We hope that our work
will inspire future research to develop more robust learning
algorithms immune to poisoning attacks.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first introduce linear regression and then
take a deep dive into defining the threat model of this paper.
2.1 Linear Regression
Linear Regression [18] is a supervised machine learning algo-
rithm, frequently used to analyze complex data relationships.
Linear regression uses inherent statistical features of the train-
ing dataset to quantitatively determine mutually dependent
relationships between two or more variables. By learning
these relationships, the resulting linear regression model can
produce a numerical output on an unseen input.
Specifically, in linear regression, the model after training
is a linear function f (x,θ) = wT +b, which seeks to regress
the value of y for a given input x. The real parameter vector
θ= (w,b) of dimension d+1 consists of the feature weights
w and the bias b, of dimensionality d and 1, respectively.
However, the true value is noted as y= f (x,θ)+e, containing
e, the error between the true value and the predicted value.
Assuming that e is Independent and Identically Distributed
(IID), the mean is 0, the variance is fixed, and that the noise
term e satisfies the Gaussian distribution:
g(y(i)|x(i);θ) = 1√
2piσ
exp(− (y
(i)−θT x(i))2
2σ2
). (1)
Then, the maximum likelihood function of the model pa-
rameters can be obtained as the product of all training sets:
L(θ) =
m
∏
i=1
g(y(i)|x(i));θ)
=
m
∏
i=1
1√
2piσ
exp(− (y
(i)−θT x(i))2
2σ2
).
(2)
The maximum value of L(θ) is maintained when the log
function is applied, logL(θ).
logL(θ) = log
m
∏
i=1
1√
2piσ
exp(− (y
(i)−θT x(i))2
2σ2
)
= m log
1√
2piσ
− 1
σ2
· 1
2
m
∑
i=1
(y(i)−θT x(i))2.
(3)
In order to obtain the maximum likelihood, the latter term
of Equation (3) is to be minimized.
We note that the maximum likelihood of linear regression
can also be converted into the minimum value of the least
squares, the most common mathematical form of the loss
function:
L(Dtr,θ) =
1
2
m
∑
i=1
( f (xi,θ)− yi)2+λΩ(w), (4)
where Dtr is the training data, Ω(w) is a regularization term
penalizing large weight values, and λ is the regularization
parameter used to prevent overfitting.2
The primary difference between popular linear regression
methods is in the choice of the regularization term. In this pa-
per, we study the following four regression models: Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS), with no regularization, Ridge regres-
sion, which uses l2−norm regularization, LASSO, which uses
l1−norm regularization, and Elastic-net regression, which
uses a combination of l1−norm and l2−norm regularization.
The work [18] elaborates on the regularization term in context
of the more common minimum least squares form of the loss
function.
Our proposed attack and defense hinge on its relative ef-
fectiveness in comparison with existing methods. We shall
inspect effectiveness in two aspects. Firstly, the degree of
poisoning by comparing the loss function of the poisoned
model with the non-poisoned model when trained on the same
dataset. The specific metric used to quantify the effect of the
poisoning attack will be the Mean Squared Error (MSE) of
the true value from the predicted value. Secondly, specific to
our defense, the time complexity of the deploying defense
shall be experimentally measured in seconds.
2.2 Threat Model
The core objective of a poisoning attack is to corrupt the
learning model generated from the training phase, such that
predictions on unseen data will greatly differ in the testing
phase. However, depending on whether the goal is to produce
predictions that greatly differ on specific subsets of input data,
while preserving predictions on the remaining subsets, or if
predictions are to be altered indiscriminately, the poisoning
attack is categorized as either an Integrity attack, or an Avail-
ability attack. A similar deconstruction of attacks is found in
backdoor poisoning attacks [8, 16, 26, 42, 43]. In this work,
we consider a poisoning availability attack.
2.2.1 Attack Assumptions
There is a sliding scale of knowledge that is assumed to be
available to the attack, from white-box to grey-box and black-
box attacks. Under the assumptions of a white-box attack,
the attacker has access to the training data Dtr, the learning
algorithm L, and the trained parameters θ. Black-box attacks
know nothing about the internal construction of the model,
with only input and output access to the model. However, situ-
ated between white-box and black-box, in a grey-box setting,
the attacker has no knowledge of the training set Dtr but has
an alternative dataset D
′
tr that has the same distribution as
the pristine training set Dtr. Internal to the model, the learn-
ing algorithm L is known; however, the trained parameters θ
2Equation (4) is an instantiation of Equation (1) in [18] for our alternative
loss E, as we shall explain later in Section 3.1.
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are not. We do note that an attacker, can approximate θ′ by
optimizing L on D
′
tr [7, 38].
It is known that black-box attacks are more practical in
real-world adversaries with less knowledge required about the
model. However, in this work we adopt the grey-box setting.
Under the grey-box setting, we assume the adversary has no
information about the structure L or parameters θ of linear
regression, and does not have access to any large training
dataset.
2.2.2 Poisoning Rates
As visualized in Figure 1, a poisoning attack is performed
by injecting poisoned data into the training set before the
regression model is (re)trained. The influence of an attacker
on the resulting model is limited by an upper bound on the
proportion α= np/N [18] of poisoned data (Dp of size np) to
the original clean data (Do of size no) in the training dataset
(DN of size N = np +no). An attacker has complete control
of the poisoning samples, as such input feature variables and
output results can be arbitrarily set within known bounds
(These feature bounds may either be derived from Dtr or D
′
tr,
or assumed if the data is normalized.). Consistent with restric-
tions imposed by our settings of MLaaS, online learning, and
retraining, prior works rarely consider poisoning rates larger
than 20%, as the attacker is limited to being able to control
only a small fraction of the training data [18]. Thus, in this
paper, we shall investigate poisoning rates up to a maximum
of α= 0.2.
2.2.3 Defense Assumptions
We shall also be investigating defenses. To the defender, the
model is a white box (as they are the model holder), the only
additional item of information a defender may not know is the
poisoning rate of an attacker. It is possible for the defender
to derive the poisoning rate from the size of the update data
provided to it. In the event of possible collusion between
collaborator, or an inability to derive the poisoning rate, it has
been argued that a poisoning rate of α= 0.2 is representative
of an upper limit of poisoning attacks, and can be assumed as
a worst-case scenario.
3 Poisoning Attack based on Optimization
Previous works have discussed a poisoning attack strategy,
which is applicable not only to linear regression, but also
to classification algorithms. Those poisoning attacks aim to
maximize the test error. However, as we have discussed, the
attack objective on linear regression is different from the
attack objectives for classification algorithms, with the latter
seeking to only produce a specific wrong answer. Therefore,
we define a new poisoning attack, Nopt poisoning attack. By
establishing a new poisoning optimization algorithm for linear
regression, this attack will force the model to receive a more
dispersed training dataset. With a more dispersed training
set this will result in larger losses and/or poor convergence
on the regression task, which may erode confidence in the
model holder, or simply result in worse prediction confidence
in practice.
3.1 Definition of Nopt Poisoning Attack
In this section, we define a new form of linear regression at-
tack, the Nopt attack. Previously in Section 2.1, we observed
that the loss function of linear regression is the sum of squares
from each point to a certain line. When more points are added,
the loss function should also increase. However, when the
added points are distributed in the similar manner as the pris-
tine data, we obtain (without considering regularization):
L(DN)
L(Do)
=
N
no
. (5)
That is, the ratio of the loss function L(DN) of the new
training set DN to the loss function L(Do) of the original
training set Do should be equal to the ratio of the size of the
new training set N to the size of the original training set no
when the poisoning data is distributed in a similar way as the
original training set. Additionally, as the new training set DN
is made up of the original training set Do and poisoning data
set Dp, we formulate our attack as follows:
E =
∣∣∣∣L(DN)L(Do) − Nno
∣∣∣∣= ∣∣∣∣L(Do+Dp)L(Do) − (no+np)no
∣∣∣∣ . (6)
As we can see from Equations (5) and (6), when the added
poisoning points are distributed in the same way as the origi-
nal data, E = 0. The further a data point is added away from
the original regression line, the higher the value of E. There-
fore, the value of E directly related to the rate of poisoning.
3.2 Application of Nopt Poisoning Attack
Previously, Jagielski et al. [18] established a double-layer
optimization problem to find the set of poisoning points that
maximizes the loss function of the original data-points. In this
section, we compose our new poisoning attack by optimizing
the objective function:
argmax
Dp
E(Dtr ∪Dp,θ(p)),
s.t. θ(p) ∈ argmin
θ
L(Dtr ∪Dp,θ).
(7)
The Nopt poisoning attack searches for poisoning data-
points Dp by maximizing E, optimizing the loss function
with respect to the poisoning training dataset. Intuitively, the
key difference between the work [18] and Nopt is that the
optimization evaluated for each subsequent poisoning point
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Figure 2: Impact on learned regression line as a result of
poisoning attacks at different poisoning rates. The original
unpoisoned data is shown in blue, while poisoning data is
shown in red.
is performed on a dataset Dtr ∪Dp that includes all previous
poisoning points, thereby creating a new poisoning point that
maximizes the loss of the collective training dataset of original
clean and poisoning points.
Algorithm 1 outlines the Nopt poisoning attack. As our
loss function takes the same form as that of [18], the process
to find the optimal points, we adopt the same gradient descent
approach. In summary, vector xc is updated through a line
search along the direction of the gradient from the outer ob-
jective E (evaluated at the current iteration). The algorithm
finishes when the outer objective E yields no further changes.
Figure 3, illustrates the iterative process of Nopt to find out
the poisoning points.
A visual representation of the learned regression line when
our attack algorithm is used with different poisoning rates is
shown in Figure 2. If the abscissa of the poisoning point must
be located in the feasible domain, then we can still obtain
an optimal solution within the feasible domain, and E will
converge.
This application scenario is realistic as the attacker’s goal
was to create poisoning data-points to interfere with the origi-
nal data-points without making the poisoning points appear
abnormal, and thus compromise the secrecy of the attack.
Therefore the attacker should determine the feasible domain
before determining the location of the poisoning point through
optimization. Through Equation (6), we obtain the set of poi-
soning points Dp with a specified poisoning degree E ′.
Algorithm 1: Nopt poisoning attack algorithm.
Input: D = Dtr (white-box) or D = D
′
tr (grey-box), L, E,
the initial poisoning attack samples D(0)p = (xc,yc)
p
c=1, a
small positive constant ε.
1: i← 0 (iteration counter);
2: θ(i)← argminθL(D∪D(i)p );
3: repeat
4: e(i)← E(θ(i));
5: θ(i+1)← θ(i);
6: for c = 1, . . . , p do
7: x(i+1)c ←linesearch (x(i)c ,∇xcE(D∪D(i+1)p ,θ(i+1)));
8: θ(i+1)← argminθL(D∪D(i+1)p );
9: e(i+1)← E(θ(i+1));
10: end for
11: i← i+1;
12: until
∣∣∣e(i)− e(i+1)∣∣∣< ε
Output: The final poisoning attack sample Dp← D(i)p .
Figure 3: The workflow of the poisoning attack algorithm
3.3 Gradient Computation
The loss function we have defined in Equation (7) takes the
same form as the loss function found in the work [18]. Con-
sequently, the derivation and computation of the gradients
are identical. For brevity, we summarize the steps taken by
Jagielski et al. [18].
Algorithm 1 reduces to a gradient-ascent task with a line
search. To compute the gradient (Oxc E(θ(p))), whilst captur-
ing the relationship between θ and the poisoning point xc, the
chain rule can be used:
OxcE = Oxcθ(xc)T ·OθE, (8)
where the first term captures the dependency of learned θ and
the point xc, and the second term is the derivative of the outer
objective with respect to the regression parameters θ.
To solve Oxcθ(xc) in the bilevel optimization problem, the
inner learning problem is replaced with its Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) equilibrium condition, i.e.,OθL(Dtr∪Dp,θ) =
0, while searching for xc. This replacement is necessary as
approximations will be required to solve the inner problem,
particularly when the inner problem is not convex (when
the inner problem is convex, it may be solved via its closed
form expression). Imposing the derivative with respect to xc
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satisfies this condition, OxcOθL(Dtr ∪Dp,θ) = 0. It is seen
that L depends explicitly on xc and implicitly through θ. One
final application of the chain rule produces the linear system:
OxcOθL+OxcθT ·O2θL = 0. (9)
For our specific form of L given in Equation (4), the deriva-
tive is follows:(
∂ωT
∂xc
∂b
∂xc
)[Σ+λg µ
µT 1
]
=−1
n
[
M ω
]
, (10)
where Σ= 1nΣixix
T
i , µ=
1
nΣixi, and M =ωx
T
c +( f (xc)−yc)Id.
When Algorithm 1 is used to implement this attack, both
xc and yc are to be updated along the gradient OxcE (cf. Al-
gorithm 1, line 7) As this method of solving the optimization
originates from the work [18], more details about the deriva-
tion can be found there.
With this, we have to use tools to perform the optimiza-
tion for our Nopt poisoning attack. Following the proposal
of the defense algorithm shown in Section 4, in Section 5
we will evaluate our attack in comparison to previous poison-
ing attacks. We shall demonstrate that our subtle change in
Equation (7) produces larger errors compared to the previous
poisoning attack on linear regression models, for the same
given poisoning rates.
4 Defense Against Poisoning Attacks
In this section, we propose a new probabilistic defense algo-
rithm, named Proda algorithm, which is designed to deal with
regression learning poisoning attacks. We shall analyze its
time complexity and efficiency. The objective of the Proda
algorithm is similar to TRIM [18], which is to find the orig-
inal training set through a subset solving algorithm, instead
of trying to identify the poisoning set of the algorithm. If
we randomly select γ points, the probability of all γ points
belonging to the unpolluted training set is:
P1 = (1−α)γ. (11)
If we randomly select β groups of γ points, the probability
that no group of points belongs to the unpolluted training set
is:
P = (1−P1)β. (12)
When P ≤ ε, a small positive constant, there must be a
group of points all belonging to the unpolluted training set.
This means if the value of β follows the rules of Equation (13),
there must be a group of γ points that all belong to the unpol-
luted training set.
(1− (1−α)γ)β ≤ ε, (13)
where α represents the poisoning rate. So the value of β is:
β= log1−(1−α)γ ε. (14)
Figure 4: The workflow of the defense algorithm
The steps of Proda algorithm are illustrated in Figure 4,
and formally detailed in Algorithm 2. However, intuitively,
the Proda algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Given α and γ, calculate the value of β.
2. Choose β groups of γ points at random. (This step can
ensure that there must be a group of γ points that all
belong to the unpolluted training set).
3. Each group of γ points is subjected to linear regression,
resulting in β lines.
4. For each line, take the n points closest to that line.
5. Each group of n points is subjected to linear regression,
resulting in β lines, and we obtain β groups of MSEs.
6. Find n points corresponding to the smallest MSE.
As Proda requires the pre-selection of γ, in Figure 5, we
graphically display the effect of different selected γ on the
resulting regression line.
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Algorithm 2: Proda algorithm.
Input: Training data D = Dtr ∪Dp of |D|= N; number of
attack points p = α ·n; γ; ε
1: β= ε/(1−aγ)
2: i←1 (iteration counter)
3: for i≤ β do
4: J(i)← a random subset of size γ ∈ {1, . . . ,a};
5: L(i)← argminθL(J(i),θ);
6: list(i)← distance of N points to L(i);
7: Q(i)← sorted(list(i))[: N];
8: S(i)← argminθL(Q(i),θ);
9: M(i)← the MSE between S(i) and Q(i);
10: i← i+1;
11: end for
12: M( j)←min(M(i));
Output: The final optimizing sets Q( j).
4.1 Efficiency
According to Equation (6), we know that from the sets of
points we randomly sample, there must be a group of points
that all belong to the unpolluted dataset. Therefore, when
comparing the MSE minimum values of β groups, even if
there are poisoning points in the group of the smallest MSE,
they must conform to the original distribution and rules of
the training dataset, and will have little impact on altering
the regression model. Therefore, we argue that the Proda
algorithm has good efficacy in mitigating the poisoning attack.
An empirical evaluation on the efficiency of different defense
algorithms will be demonstrated in Section 5.
The goal is to select γ points that all belong to the original
training set and that these points sufficiently reproduce the
linear relationship of the original training set. Our algorithm
can guarantee that the γ selected points are likely to all be-
long to the original training set, but whether these points can
represent the linear regression trend of the original training
set depends on the value of γ.
It is known that for one-dimensional inputs, two points are
required to define a linear relationship, between the input (R)
and the one dimensional output (R), and for two dimensional
inputs, three points, to define the linear relationship between
the input (R2) and output (R). Therefore, assuming the size
of uncontaminated training sets is m = no, and the feature
dimensionality of the training dataset is d, the minimum value
of γ also needs to be at least one feature dimension greater
than the input training set (Rd), i.e., γ> d+1.
When γ = d + 1, we can only guarantee that the line ob-
tained by the defense algorithm is d-dimensional. Therefore,
it is very difficult to make randomly selected γ points in train-
ing set of m points that conform to the original trends of the
dataset.
Assuming that the points in the unpoisoned training set are
evenly distributed, we can obtain the relationship between
Figure 5: Different parameters γ used in the Proda algorithm.
The original unpoisoned data-points are shown in blue, poi-
soning datapoints in red, and defensive data-points generated
by the Proda algorithm in green, where green data-points are
subsets of blue ones. The Proda algorithm screens out the
subsets of uncontaminated datasets.
the MSE of the original training set Dtr on its corresponding
line θtr and the MSE of the γ points Dγ on its corresponding
line θγ, as shown in Equation (15):
MSE(Dtr,θtr)≤ mγ ·MSE(Dγ,θγ). (15)
As γ increases, the difference between MSE(Dtr,θtr) and
m
γ ·MSE(Dγ,θγ) becomes smaller, defense algorithms would
also be more efficient, but the corresponding time complexity
will become worse (We will analyze the time complexity of
the defense algorithm in detail in Section 4.2.).
4.2 Time Complexity
We now compute the time complexity of our proposed defense.
According to Equation (6), we know that the probability of
at least one group of γ points all belonging to the unpolluted
data set is:
Pu = 1− (1− (1−α)γ)β. (16)
When P≤ ε, Pu approaches 1. The value of β satisfies:
β> log1−(1−α)γ(1−Pu). (17)
That is, at least β times of random point selection can be
carried out to obtain a high probability of obtaining a group
of γ points which are all uncontaminated data.
Thus, the time complexity of Proda algorithm is:
T (n) = O(n)× log1−(1−α)γ(1−Pu), (18)
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where O(n) is the time complexity of the linear regression
algorithm. We note that if the feature dimensionality of the
training data set is d, and γ> d+1, the minimum time com-
plexity can be found as T (n) =O(n)× log1−(1−α)d+1(1−Pu).
In contrast, for the time complexity of the TRIM algorithm,
which we obtain by inspecting the TRIM algorithm, the worst
case of TRIM involves the traversal of all n training subsets;
thus, TRIM may iterate
(M
m
)
times.3 Therefore, when the time
complexity of TRIM is compared to our Proda algorithm, a
huge improvement is expected.
5 Experimental Analysis
Note that our poisoning attack algorithm in Section 3 is stated
without any assumptions on the training data distribution. In
practice, such information on training data is typically un-
available to attackers. Moreover, an adaptive attacker can also
inject poisoning samples to modify the mean and covariance
of training data. Thus, we argue that our attack algorithm
results are stronger than prior works as we rely on fewer
assumptions except for the work [18] (IEEE S&P 2018) of
which the assumptions are same as ours. To evaluate the effec-
tiveness of our attacks and defenses, we have selected two key
metrics: MSE to measure the effects of poisoning as a result
of the attacks and defenses (or the “success” of the attack),
and the time complexity of each configuration; this time is
computed by multiplying the number of iterations required for
each configuration (we assume and average of 1000 iterations
per 1µs on our computer hardware).
Our attack and defense algorithms were implemented in
Python 3.7, leveraging the NumPy and scikit-learn libraries.
We use a conventional cross-validation method to split the
datasets into three equally-sized sets for training, validation,
and testing. To ensure data splitting biases are not introduced,
we repeat each experiment and average results over 5 inde-
pendent runs.
The remainder of this section is laid out as follows. We first
describe the datasets used in our experiments in Section 5.1.
Followed by Section 5.2, we compare results obtained from
our poisoning optimization algorithm with previous poisoning
attacks on the datasets we have obtained, across four different
types of regression models. Finally, we present the results of
our Proda algorithm and compare it with previous defenses
in Section 5.3.
5.1 Datasets
We first introduce the four publicly available datasets used in
our evaluation.
• Housing Prices [22], a dataset used for predicting the
price of the house at the time of sale given attributes of
the house structure, and location information.
3No time complexity threshold was provided in TRIM’s proposal [18].
• Loans [21], a lending dataset that seeks to estimate the
appropriate interest rate of a loan given information
about the total loan size, interest rate, amount of prin-
cipal paid off, and the borrower’s personal information
such as credit status, and state of residence.
• Pharm [29], a pharmaceuticals dataset that estimates the
dosage of Warfarin for a patient depending on physical
attributes of said patient, such as age, height, and weight.
• Bike Sharing [10], the Capital Bikeshare system dataset
estimates the number of vehicles within a certain time
period, given hourly information of rental bikes and en-
vironmental variables like weather.
The aforementioned datasets, with the exception of the bike
sharing dataset, have been used in previous evaluations of poi-
soning attacks on regression models [18].4 All datasets are
pre-processed in the same manner, with categorical variables
one-hot encoded, and numerical features normalized between
0 and 1. This produces 275, 89, 204, and 15 features for Hous-
ing, Loans, Pharm, and Bike Sharing, respectively. In total,
each dataset contains 1460, 887383, 4683, and 17389 records,
respectively. However, due to computational limitations, the
only first 5, 4, 3, and 8 features of the Housing Prices, Loans,
Pharm, Bike Sharing datasets, respectively, were used in the
defense evaluation.
5.2 Nopt Poisoning Attack
We now perform experiments on the four selected regression
datasets to evaluate our newly proposed attack. In addition, we
compare our results to MSEs of the unpoisoned dataset and
the optimization attack as proposed by Jagielski et al. [18].
We use MSE as the metric for assessing the effectiveness
of an attack, and also compute the attacks’ time complexity.
We vary the poisoning rate between 4% and 20% at intervals
of 4% with the goal of inferring the trend in attack success.
Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9 show the MSE of each attack on OLS,
Ridge, LASSO, and Elastic-net regression, respectively. We
note that Jagielski et al. [18] had only evaluated Ridge and
LASSO regression. We plot results for the unpoisoned dataset
(called Unpoison), optimization attack, proposed by Jagielski
et al. [18] (called Opt), in addition to our Nopt attack. The
horizontal coordinate is the poisoning rate α, that is, the pro-
portion of pollution data in the new training dataset, and the
vertical coordinate is the MSE of the model trained on the poi-
soned dataset. Overall it can be observed from the diagrams
that Nopt is able to achieve larger MSE (in comparison to
Opt) for the same poisoning rate. While every configuration
of the regression type, dataset and poisoning rate observes
Nopt exceeding Opt, we note that Figures 7(c) and 8(c) show
a relatively similar increase of MSE between the two attacks.
4We have used the datasets available at https://github.com/
jagielski/manip-ml.
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(a) House Prices Dataset (b) Loans Dataset (c) Pharm Dataset (d) Bike Sharing Dataset
Figure 6: Mean Squared Error (MSE) of poisoning attacks on OLS regression on the four datasets
(a) House Prices Dataset (b) Loans Dataset (c) Pharm Dataset (d) Bike Sharing Dataset
Figure 7: MSE of attacks on Ridge regression on the four datasets
In Table 1, we detail the specific MSEs of our new attack
(Nopt) and the optimization attack proposed by Jagielski et
al. [18] (Opt). For this table, we reproduce the numerical value
of the MSE at a fixed poisoning rate of α= 0.2. From Table 1
we can observe that when the poisoning rate is α= 0.2, our
attack (Nopt) is again consistently higher than that of the
previous attack algorithm (Opt). Our results confirm that the
optimization framework we design demonstrates increased
effectiveness when poisoning both different linear regression
models and across datasets. The Nopt attack can achieve
MSEs with a factor of 1.3 higher than the Opt attack in the
House dataset, a factor of 1.5 higher in the Loan dataset, a
factor of 1.2 higher than Opt in the Pharm dataset, and a factor
of 4.0 higher than Opt in the bike sharing dataset.
5.3 Proda Defense Algorithm
In this section, we evaluate if our Proda algorithm can effec-
tively defend against the optimized attack (Nopt), the attack
that produced the highest MSE in Section 5.2.
We shall use two measures in the experiment: the differ-
ence of MSE and time complexity. We evaluated the MSE
among the resulting dataset of the Proda algorithm, the result-
ing dataset of TRIM algorithm, and the unpolluted dataset.
We also evaluated the time complexity of our defense by mea-
suring the running time of the algorithm. For the probability
algorithm, different γ values will produce different operation
results and time complexities; thus our experiments will also
contain results for different values of γ.
5.3.1 Defense Efficiency
When the experiment was performed, γ and α are assumed
known to be the defender (Recall from Section 2.2.2, α is
known by the defender, as they can assume that every sample
submitted to the learning process is likely to be malicious; in
the event that the α is unknown and cannot be found by the
defender, the defender can assume an upper bound of 0.2 poi-
soning rate.). Therefore in specific cases, β, the intermediate
variable, would not change. So, if γ is given, MSE varies only
with the poisoning rate (Figure 11, for a fixed γ = 50). If a
poisoning rate α is given, MSE varies only with γ (Figure 10,
for a fixed α= 0.2).
Figure 10 shows the resulting MSE of the poisoning attack
when setting different values of γ for the defense algorithm.
We can see that when γ is small, the defense efficacy of Proda
is less than that of TRIM (with the exception of the bike shar-
ing dataset, where the MSE is the same), but with an increase
of γ, the effectiveness of Proda in removing the influence of
poisoning samples increases, however at the cost of additional
computational time (see Table 2). As we have previously de-
scribed in Section 4, Proda seeks to find a subset of data that
contains only clean samples, as the presence of poisoning
points will increase the MSE of the resulting regression (in
the overall model and in each subset evaluated by Proda), poi-
soning points that greatly increase the dispersion of the subset
(and thus MSE) will be discarded by Proda. In Figure 10(b),
when γ is equal to twice the number of features, the MSE
of the probability algorithm result is lower than the MSE of
the unpolluted dataset, while the remaining datasets observe
lower MSE compared to the unpoisoned dataset for all values
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(a) House Prices Dataset (b) Loans Dataset (c) Pharm Dataset (d) Bike Sharing Dataset
Figure 8: MSE of attacks on LASSO regression on the four datasets
(a) House Prices Dataset (b) Loans Dataset (c) Pharm Dataset (d) Bike Sharing Dataset
Figure 9: MSE of attacks on Elastic-net regression on the four datasets
(a) House Prices Dataset (b) Loans Dataset (c) Pharm Dataset (d) Bike Sharing Dataset
Figure 10: The effects of increasing γ on the efficiency of defense algorithms on our four datasets (The poisoning algorithm
is Nopt on LASSO regression, poisoning rate α = 0.2.). Both TRIM and Proda algorithms have smaller MSE results than
unpoisoned data sets. When the γ value is large, the defensive effect of the two algorithms converge. In the bike sharing dataset,
three lines of Unpoison, TRIM and Proda overlap. The Proda algorithm achieves a satisfying defense effect when γ is set to be
the minimum value d+1.
(a) House Prices Dataset (b) Loans Dataset (c) Pharm Dataset (d) Bike Sharing Dataset
Figure 11: The effects of different poisoning rates α on the efficiency of defense algorithms on our four datasets (The poisoning
algorithm is Nopt of LASSO regression, γ = 50.) Both Proda and TRIM algorithms display good defensive performances
at various poisoning rates. In the house price dataset and pharm dataset, the two trends overlap. In the bike sharing dataset,
Unpoison, TRIM, and Proda trends overlap.
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Table 1: Comparison of MSE between Opt and our newly
proposed Nopt poisoning algorithms. It can be observed that
in all configurations, our attack achieves a larger MSE.
Dataset Regression MSE after Poisoning (α= 0.2)
Opt Nopt
House Prices
OLS 0.055 0.07
Ridge 0.07 0.10
LASSO 0.085 0.10
Elastic-net 0.04 0.08
Loans
OLS 0.061 0.081
Ridge 0.043 0.095
LASSO 0.062 0.094
Elastic-net 0.032 0.091
Pharm
OLS 0.077 0.10
Ridge 0.134 0.145
LASSO 0.11 0.14
Elastic-net 0.031 0.11
Bike Sharing
OLS 0.04 0.16
Ridge 0.036 0.15
LASSO 0.049 0.15
Elastic-net 0.0413 0.157
of γ. This indicates that a proper γ can induce not only an
effective defense result observed, but it also has assisted in
the generalization of the model. We assert that the result is
obtained as Proda also removes poor training points that may
exist in the unpolluted dataset. It can be seen from Figures 10
and 11 that the resulting MSE of TRIM algorithm is lower
than the resulting MSE of the probability algorithm and lower
than the MSE of the unpolluted dataset until γ is much larger.
We can infer from four figures, that it is likely that there ex-
ists a value of γ which will result in Proda performing better
than TRIM. We note that we have not evaluated other de-
fenses since Jagielski et al. [18] have shown that TRIM, their
state of the art, is capable of outperforming prior defense
mechanisms. In the bike sharing dataset, we can see from Fig-
ure 10(d) that three lines of Unpoison, TRIM, and Proda are
almost compressed to one line, indicating their performances
resemble each other. Proda has achieved a satisfying defense
effect when the parameter γ is set as a minimum threshold, i.e.,
γ= d+1. Although the three lines overlap almost completely
all the way to α= 41, if we further zoom in, the performance
of Proda’s defense will boost as the γ increases.
5.3.2 Time Complexity
In Section 4.2, we analyzed the time complexity of Proda
and TRIM, and found that the worst case of Proda is superior
to TRIM. In both Tables 2 and 3, we detail the respective
computed time complexities of Proda and TRIM, for different
Table 2: Comparison of defense algorithm time performance
when γ is varied for Proda on four datasets (The poisoning
attack used for this evaluation is Nopt on Ridge regression
with the poisoning rate α= 0.2. The size of our unpoisoned
training set is 300.).
Dataset Algorithm γ Time Complexity Time Complexity(average, s) (worst case, s)
House Prices
TRIM - 0.021 ≥ 580
Proda
6 0.037 0.037
28 5.946 5.946
50 806.646 806.646
Loans
TRIM - 0.021 ≥ 580
Proda
5 0.028 0.028
25 3.041 9.294
45 264.318 264.318
Pharm
TRIM - 0.021 ≥ 580
Proda
4 0.021 0.021
30 9.294 9.294
60 7512.528 7512.528
Bike Sharing
TRIM - 0.021 ≥ 580
Proda
9 0.079 0.079
25 3.041 3.041
41 108.261 108.261
values of γ (see Table 2), and different values of α (see Ta-
ble 3). We reiterate that the time complexity indicated in these
tables are computed by the number of iterations established
in Section 4.2 with an assumed average processing speed of
1000 iterations per 1µs on our computing hardware.
In Table 2, for a fixed α = 0.2, the time complexity of
Proda algorithm is directly related to γ and the number of
features (recall that 5, 4, 3, and 8 features were used in House,
Loan, Pharm, and Bike Sharing datasets, respectively), while
the time complexity of the TRIM algorithm is related to the
training data size (The size of our unpoisoned training set is
300.). From the average and worst-case time complexities
shown in Table 3, it can be observed that TRIM is faster than
the Proda on the average case; however, our Proda algorithm
provides an upper bound on the time complexity. In Table 3,
we observe time complexities for a fixed γ= 50, but a varying
poisoning rate α, we can see that the worst-case time com-
plexity of the two algorithms increases with the increase of
the poisoning rate α; however, as we have shown earlier in
Section 4.2, Proda is bounded by the worst-case scenario.
Note that TRIM algorithm uses an iterative search to find
the smallest MSE subset as its defense. Suppose the size
of the poisoned training set is k. The worst-case scenario
for TRIM is to exhaust
( k
(1−α)k
)
subsets to converge. In the
case of a poisoning rate of α= 0.2, TRIM will not terminate
until it has compared MSEs of
( k
0.8k
)
subsets (> 1.6k subsets,
given Stirling’s approximation). In contrast, Proda algorithm
squarely selects the smallest MSEs of 1−αk unpoisoned
data-points from our randomly chosen subsets; hence, the
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Table 3: Comparison of defense algorithm time performance
when the poisoning rate α is varied on four datasets (The
poisoning attack is Nopt on Ridge regression with a fixed
γ= 50. The size of our unpoisoned training set is 300.).
Dataset Algorithm α Time Complexity Time Complexity(average, s) (worst case, s)
House Prices
TRIM
4% 0.021 ≥ 518
12% 0.021 ≥ 543
20% 0.021 ≥ 580
Proda
4% 0.143 0.143
12% 12.162 12.162
20% 806.646 806.646
Loans
TRIM
4% 0.021 ≥ 518
12% 0.021 ≥ 543
20% 0.021 ≥ 580
Proda
4% 0.143 0.143
12% 12.162 12.162
20% 806.646 806.646
Pharm
TRIM
4% 0.021 ≥ 518
12% 0.021 ≥ 543
20% 0.021 ≥ 580
Proda
4% 0.143 0.143
12% 12.162 12.162
20% 806.646 806.646
Bike Sharing
TRIM
4% 0.021 ≥ 518
12% 0.021 ≥ 543
20% 0.021 ≥ 580
Proda
4% 0.143 0.143
12% 12.162 12.162
20% 806.646 806.646
time complexity of Proda algorithm is dependent only on the
value of the parameter γ we define, consequently offering a
substantial reduction in the worst-case time complexity of
such a defense.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the limitations of this paper and
survey the related work.
6.1 Limitations
Supervised machine learning algorithms can solve common
regression and classification problems, but the training data of
supervised machine learning may potentially be manipulated
by attackers seeking to interfere with the training process for
their own nefarious purposes. For example, an attacker may
add poisoning data to interfere with a supervised machine
learning algorithm and likewise, a defender can use data opti-
mization to prevent data poisoning attacks. In data poisoning
attacks, attackers may have a variety of goals to interfere the
regression result. In this work we focus on maximizing the
dispersion of the training set. As we have discussed earlier,
an investigation into the possibility of a targeted attack is still
in question.
When defending against poisoning attacks, the Proda algo-
rithm seeks to find a subset of points that minimize the linear
regression loss function. In prior work TRIM [18], defense
algorithms have been proposed against linear regression poi-
soning attacks. Both TRIM [18] and our work are based on
the premise that the loss function of linear regression greatly
increases with the addition of even a single poisoned point, a
method that differs from other approaches which seek to clas-
sify or isolate poisoned points. What our approaches differ is
that the worst-case time complexity of our defense algorithm
Proda is better than TRIM [18]. While we have experimen-
tally demonstrated the effectiveness in removing the effect of
poisoning attacks, it is possible that Proda can be retooled to
detect the subset of poisoning points.
Our Proda algorithm has a parameter γ, which controls the
precision and time complexity of the defense algorithm. The
setting of the parameter γ is data-dependent; however, we have
established that γ should not be less than one more than the
dimension of the dataset d+1. Experimentally, we observed
that a larger γ will produce lower MSE at the expense of a
higher time complexity. It can be seen from Figure 10 that
when γ approaches d2, Proda algorithm can obtain basically
stable defense efficiency. The specific value of γ should be
chosen based on a time complexity acceptable to the defender.
6.2 Related Work
With machine learning models deployed in a wider range of
applications, the research community has subject machine
learning algorithms as the target of a multitude of attacks
from data poisoning attacks, backdoor attacks, and evasion
attacks. In data poisoning attacks, the attacker can either com-
promise the integrity of the system for specific users, without
affecting the use of the system for regular users, or make the
system unavailable for all users by manipulating the training
data. Backdoor attacks are a type of attack aimed at fooling
the model with corrupted inputs. The backdoor attacker trains
(or retrains) a model with poisoned data to obtain a model that
performs well on a benign test set but behaves erroneously
when a pre-determined trigger is applied to an input. Eva-
sion attacks, however, seek to exploit the decision space of
a trained model by finding small perturbations that can be
added to an input to evade particular outputs of a model, for
example, hide malware from detection. Many of these attacks
stem from works on Adversarial Examples, whereby machine
learning models were shown to be highly sensitive to small
adversarial perturbations to the input [14, 15, 27, 46].
Poisoning attacks. Data poisoning attacks are a general class
of attacks that manipulate the training data of a machine-
learning system such that the learned model behaves in a
way dictated by the attacker. Such poisoning techniques have
been studied in various applications, such as anomaly detec-
tion [41] and email spam filtering [35]. It has also been shown
that data poisoning attacks are indifferent to the underlying
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machine learning algorithm (SVMs [6,50], regression [18,51],
graph-based approaches [48, 56], neural networks [16], and
federated learning [11]). While the aforementioned works
primarily compromise classification tasks, there has also been
work on poisoning recommender systems [13, 24, 53]. Most
relevant to ours is attacks against regression tasks [18, 33],
whereas our attack outperforms all the prior works.
Backdoor attacks. Backdoor attacks target the training set of
the machine learning algorithm, contaminating the training set
with poisoned samples of either a target class [8], or all classes
(untargeted) [1, 19]. The goal of the backdoor is to force a
machine learning model to learn that when a pre-determined
trigger is present in an input (targeted or non-targeted) the
model should output a class that has been pre-determined
by the attacker. However, as the backdoor name suggests,
when inputs without the trigger are present, the model should
perform indifferently to an un-backdoored model. Many of
the backdoor works to date have focused on images, with an
increasing number of works seeking to make their triggers
harder to detect by both automated detection mechanisms and
humans inspectors [2, 25, 28, 42, 43].
Clean label attacks. Both poisoning attacks [44, 55] and
backdoor attacks [47, 54] have seen development towards
clean-label attacks. An arguably harder attack scenario seeks
to produce corrupted data inputs that still resemble the as-
signed label. While for a classification task this label is well
defined, in regression problems, as we have studied in this
work, the “correct” output is a bit more arbitrary and may
be hard to judge. The primary interest in clean labels is on
inputs that take the form of an image, or video, as upon human
inspection, it is clear that a discrepancy may exist between
the input and the label. On the contrary, when dealing with
purely numerical inputs and outputs, as commonly found in
regression tasks, there may not be a clear relationship for a
human inspector to scrutinize, and for clean labels to be a
necessary requirement in such an attack.
Evasion attacks. While poisoning and backdoor attacks have
access to the machine learning training stage to launch their
attack, the evasion attack does not have this luxury. The eva-
sion attack is launched post-model training, whereby attackers
attempt to manipulate the data inputs to force a desired out-
put [5, 37]. Without the ability to alter the model parameters,
the attack explores the decision boundary (on classification
models), or learned relationships (on regression models) to
find a perturbation that may be applied to the input (to provide
the forced output). Oftentimes evasion attacks are posed as
a means to bypass security implements, such as spam filter-
ing [20, 23, 31], network intrusion detection [49], and biomet-
ric recognition [3, 40].
Defenses against poisoning attacks. Many defense mech-
anisms have been proposed to defend against poisoning at-
tacks [4,7,35,41]. One core approach to mitigating poisoning
attacks is to recognize that the poisoned data is intentionally
dissimilar to the clean training data (as to inflict the greatest
change to the learning process). Due to the limitation on the
proportion of poisoned data to clean data an attacker has con-
trol over, the poisoned data may be treated as outliers, and
mitigated with data sanitization techniques [9, 17, 39]. The
other means to defend against potentially poisoned data is
to use robust learning algorithms [18, 30, 41, 52]. These al-
gorithms are designed to limit the sensitivity to any single
sample within the training data. Differential privacy has also
been investigated as a means to mitigate data poisoning at-
tacks [32]. Specifically for regression models, the closest to
this work is TRIM [18], a defense capable of managing a large
number of poisoning data points. Like Proda, TRIM finds a
subset of training data that minimizes the model loss, and uses
this subset as a representative set to train the non-poisoned
model.
7 Conclusion
We systematically study the poisoning attack and its defense
for regression models in an online or MLaaS setting. We have
proposed a modification to an attack optimization framework
that requires no additional knowledge of the training pro-
cess, yet produces better offensive results. Our attack allows
attackers to carry out both white-box and grey-box attacks
and is capable of increasing the dispersion of the poisoned
training set. However, as attackers may have many goals in
the interference of the regression outcome, the possibility of
targeted attacks remains in question. To respond to a more
powerful poisoning attack developed in this paper, we de-
signed a probabilistic defense algorithm, Proda, which can
be tuned to effectively mitigate poisoning attacks on the re-
gression model while significantly reducing the worst-case
time complexity. We highlight that the time complexity of
the state-of-the-art defense, TRIM, had not been estimated;
however, we deduce from their work that TRIM can take
exponential time complexity in the worst-case scenario, in
excess of Proda’s logarithmic time. We have comparatively
evaluated the state-of-the-art attacks and defenses against our
own on several datasets in the fields of real estate, financial
lending, health care, and bike sharing services. While we have
experimentally demonstrated an effective mitigation of poi-
soning attacks by identifying a clean subset, there persists
the possibility that our proposed defense can be retooled to
detect the subset of poisoned data. Currently in our defense,
Proda, we experimentally find the important parameter γ. One
future avenue of this research is to be able to automatically
determine a value of γ with an acceptable time complexity
for the defender. Finally, we hope that our work will inspire
future research to develop more robust learning algorithms
that are not susceptible to poisoning attacks.
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